

in the Communist camp. Baiting the Russian bear would seem a dangerous game and could very well evoke drastic action from the Soviets.

An article in the main Soviet Army newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), on 14 February bluntly reaffirming the Brezhnev Doctrine is clearly directed at Rumania and Yugoslavia, and is certainly a Soviet response to Rumania's defiant behavior. The fact that the article is cast in theoretical terms, is apparently written by a major general, and published in a prestigious military journal is intended to impress on the Rumanians the gravity of their offense and presumably to warn them that military action against them is not precluded.

Now it is reported that Soviet Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, Warsaw Pact Commander, and Vasiliy Y. Kuznetsov, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and trouble-shooter for the Kremlin in post-invasion Czechoslovakia, arrived in Bucharest on 20 February for talks. What pressures they will exert to bring Rumania back in line may become evident in coming weeks.

c. PCI Schizophrenia

The focus of the world's attention was on the PCI, perhaps the most important free world CP and the leading critic of the Soviet invasion. Luigi Longo, ailing Secretary General of the party, defining the PCI's relationship with the Soviet Union in his main address, reiterated unequivocally his condemnation of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. He also emphasized his espousal of the principle of autonomy and sovereignty for all Communist parties and socialist states, thus implicitly, but unmistakably, taking issue with the Brezhnev Doctrines. Finally, he gave renewed voice to a favorite Italian Communist view, that of rejecting the idea of "guiding" states in the international movement, thus denying to the Soviet Union exclusive leadership of the movement. The Congress delegates noisily applauded his stand on Czechoslovakia, an indication that there is probably little disagreement in the PCI on the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. There had been an unknown degree of pro-Soviet sentiment in the PCI, which the Congress now indicates was probably negligible. By way of contrast, a Yugoslav observer noted the unusual, if not unique, phenomenon in a CP Congress of utter silence greeting the mention of the name of the Secretary General of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev.

By these positions, the PCI continues to disturb the increasingly desperate efforts of the Soviets to restore unity and harmony to the world Communist movement. This stance of independence from the CPSU is attributable perhaps less to matters of principle than to considerations of the PCI's domestic strategy of qualifying as a future coalition partner in an Italian government.

The PCI is also representative of many free world parties in its ambivalent, if not schizoid, relationship to the Soviet Union in that

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Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(23 January - 20 February 1969)

1. The PCI Congress and the International Communist Scene

a. Disagreement over Czechoslovakia Persists

The 12th Congress of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which was held in Bologna 8-15 February, was the subject of much advance speculation on the part of both Communists and non-Communists inasmuch as it was the first major open forum since the invasion of Czechoslovakia where Communists of diverse shades of opinion from many countries would go on record regarding the most disastrous event of the Communist year, the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At stake was the unity of the world Communist movement, a unity the Soviets intensely wish to demonstrate by a harmonious gathering of the Communist parties in Moscow at the forthcoming World Communist Conference (WCC) next May. Though the full effect of the events and aftermath of the PCI Congress in terms of world Communist unity cannot yet be judged (as of this writing the statements of many parties at the Congress are not available), it is clear that the positions of some key protagonists in the disagreement have not changed. In general, important CP's which condemned the Soviet invasion, notably the Italian, Rumanian, and Yugoslav, held firmly to their disapproving stand, whereas the Soviets and their invasion partners defended their action in mild and muted tones. The Italian CP's strong stand came as somewhat of a surprise since the PCI had reportedly been subjected to great pressure, financial and otherwise, by the Soviet Union, and had shown signs of bending under it.

b. Rumania Resumes Maverick Role

In a Congress which produced no major surprises, especial interest attached to the surprisingly strong Rumanian CP condemnation of the Czech invasion, particularly since the Rumanian leaders have generally maintained a discreet and safe silence on the issue since their initial condemnatory outburst immediately after the event last August. This new condemnation added insult to injury for the Soviets, since just a week before the Congress, on 1-2 February, Rumanian CP boss Nicolae Ceausescu had ostentatiously met in Timisoara, Rumania, with Yugoslav leader Tito, whose long-standing independence and defiance of the Soviet Union makes him in the Soviet view a downright subversive force in Eastern Europe. Further, a day before the opening of the PCI Congress, Ceausescu had explicitly and emphatically denounced the Brezhnev Doctrine (also known as the doctrine of "limited sovereignty") by which the Soviet Union reserves the right to take any action, including military (as in Czechoslovakia), to insure that the European Communist countries conform in all essential respects to Soviet requirements in domestic as well as foreign policy. Thus, Rumania seems to be resuming its earlier role of maverick, thereby adding to the picture of disunity

it reaffirms its loyalty to that country in the same breath that it condemns the fundamental principle on which the Soviet Union bases its relationship to these parties, i.e., the Brezhnev Doctrine!

Longo devoted considerable attention to the "internationalism" of the PCI, but it may be an indication of the difficulty the Soviets will have in convoking a harmonious WCC that Longo allowed himself only the following terse remark concerning the WCC: "We think that the forthcoming international conference of Communist and workers' parties will be useful if it succeeds in signaling an important stage in re-establishing the internationalism we all need."

d. Soviet Anxieties

The Soviet delegation, headed by CPSU Secretary Boris Ponomarev, sat through the painful Congress, suffering through the repeated, scarcely veiled attacks on Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia, through the cool reception accorded the Soviet point of view, hoping that the cracks in the once solid wall of international Communist unity would not look too wide to the outside world. Ponomarev's speech and that of the Secretary General of the servile Bulgarian CP, Zhivko Zhivkov, defended their action against Czechoslovakia, but in defensive, non-provocative tones, seeking to pass over the divisive issue with a minimum of controversy. In the interest of restoring the appearance of international Communist unity (crucial for a successful WCC in the spring) the Soviets and their closest satellites apparently determined on a coordinated strategy at the Congress of doing their best to prevent a renewed flare-up of the divisive Czech controversy by not giving offense to their critics. It is hard to avoid the impression that the Soviets and their allies were publicly humiliated at the hands of their critics at the PCI Congress and it will be interesting to see in coming weeks how they will react. It may be that Soviet anxiety over the WCC next May will be an overriding consideration, disposing them to swallow the indignities they underwent in Bologna. Or, they may resort once again to bullying tactics toward free world parties critical of their actions.

2. Outlook in Czechoslovakia

In January the Czechoslovaks by all accounts were in the grip of their most serious crisis since the invasion itself because of the passions stirred by the self-immolations, particularly that of Jan Palach, and it was nip and tuck whether the Soviets would intervene in some forceful way. One way or another the Czechoslovak leaders survived the crisis and have resumed execution of the Soviet policy of "normalization," i.e., the extinction of all genuine vestiges of democracy.

The uniqueness of Czechoslovakia as a Communist-ruled country ultimately subject to dictates of Soviet policy lies in the fact that ever since the Dubcek regime took over, it has had, more than any other Communist regime, to adapt its policies to popular demands. Before the

Soviet invasion it seems to have done so as a matter of voluntary principle, but since the Soviet invasion, it has done so more or less involuntarily. The Soviet goal in Czechoslovakia (being gradually achieved) has been to rule without any regard to the popular will. (It is a goal sought, and largely achieved, by all Communist regimes.) This state of affairs is what the Soviets seek to attain by "normalization" in Czechoslovakia. During the past month the Czech leadership, responding to Soviet demands, has continued to make uneven progress in that direction.

It may be that Ponomarev's rather strong endorsement at the PCI Congress of the Dubcek leadership was a reflection of a determined effort by the Soviets to keep the Czech situation calm with an eye to the WCC. Many observers have noted that the success (and even the convocation) of the WCC is predicated on the avoidance of a new crisis in the Czech situation which might necessitate another heavy-handed Soviet intervention.

3. Comintern 50th Anniversary

Soviet propaganda has given spotty coverage to the approaching fiftieth anniversary this March of the founding of the Third (Communist) International. The Comintern was a far-flung, powerful organization through which Stalin directed the world-wide Communist subversive effort and ruled foreign Communist parties with an iron hand. It was disbanded by Stalin in 1943 on request of the British and Americans (who of course were allied at the time with the Soviet Union). There appears to have been very little written about it in the Soviet press in recent times, though the most authoritative theoretical organ of the CPSU, Kommunist, in issue No. 2 of January 1969, for some obscure reason ran an article purporting to be a recently discovered resolution of the Comintern Executive Committee of 1 April 1936. This rather odd treatment of the Comintern anniversary suggests a vacillating attitude on the part of Soviet publicists and their policy bosses as to whether to celebrate the occasion full tilt (and possibly tie it to the current effort to rehabilitate Stalin's military reputation) or whether to do as little as possible about it in view of the sensitivities of many important free world parties concerning Soviet bossing of the international Communist movement. While there is no tangible evidence that the Soviets intend to use the WCC next May as a means of restoring some sort of organizational framework over the international movement, it is without question something they fervently wish they could have, and it can be assumed they are working toward this goal behind the scenes.

4. Soviet Warning to China?

While the article in Red Star by General K. Bochkarev referred to in para. 1.b. above was pointed most particularly at Rumania and Yugoslavia, it is perhaps no accident that the date of 14 February was chosen

for this military warning: It is the anniversary of the Sino-Soviet military pact signed in 1950, never abrogated but passed over without mention by both the Soviets and Chinese from 1967 on. That this anniversary was chosen for a forceful reiteration of the Brezhnev Doctrine by the Soviet military suggests it may have been intended as a warning to the Chinese that the doctrine of limited sovereignty applies to China as well and that China is not immune to the fate that befell Czechoslovakia and which threatens Rumania and Yugoslavia.

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NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOUTH

1. Korea is so removed from much of the world, both culturally and geographically, that it is something of a problem to focus world attention on potential trouble there. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that it is also an area which the free world, in a sense, set aside for history and in deference to the more pressing and dramatic problems of the 1960's. It is our aim to shed some light on what North Korea has been up to since the Korean Armistice in 1953 and particularly to clarify what Pyongyang means by its current talk of "reunification," "guerrilla-based insurgency," "war of national liberation" and the like.
2. The situation is not clearcut and some blame for continued attacks across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) can be placed on South Korea's 440,000-man army and her million-man militia. However, there is little question that North Korea is the principal culprit. She has sent hundreds of infiltration teams into South Korea, is training sabotage teams specifically for operations against the South, is importing quantities of sophisticated equipment particularly useful to commandos and is aggressively asserting her intention to unify the country.
3. These facts about North Korean subversion should find a receptive audience in nearby nations most likely to become embroiled if the armed conflict develops further. Potential audiences also exist among present or would-be trading partners of both North and South Korea, among United Nations members -- particularly those which contributed troops to the South Korean cause in the 1950 - 1953 war -- and among nations considering diplomatic or cultural exchanges with either North or South Korea.
4. It might be profitable in many areas to point out these similarities between North Korea's efforts to infiltrate troops with the aim of creating a picture of a genuine rebellion and the efforts of North Vietnam and Cuba. Although there was certainly more of a base for revolutionary warfare in South Vietnam than in South Korea, the support in men and material from the North was essential to its active existence. The Cuban effort to export revolution to Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela or Bolivia was somewhat different, due principally to the fact that Cuba is an island; otherwise the parallel is not far-fetched. Particularly useful and timely in reminding audiences of North Korea's efforts to export revolution are the Ulchin landings of November 1968 which furnished conclusive proof of North Korea's aggressive intentions (See Background Use Only paper).
5. North Korea's failure to establish a strong subversive apparatus in the South or to create conditions for launching an indigenous guerrilla movement is primarily due to the strong anti-Communism of South Korea's citizens. Many of them have risked their lives to notify the authorities of the intruders' presence. In fact, it is estimated that 90% of the North Korean agents who have penetrated the South have been captured as a direct result of tips from ordinary South Korean citizens. The

testimony of captured North Korean agents has revealed that they had been taught to expect a warm welcome from an oppressed people and instead found an anti-Communism among the South Korean people so strong that they were completely unprepared to cope with it -- their own propagandists had never mentioned it. This strong stand, in turn, can be attributed to three things: the South Koreans' practical experience with Communism and the nation's outstanding progress since 1953 towards political stability and a viable economy.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF NORTH KOREANAGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOUTH

North Korea's campaign of terrorism and subversion against the Republic of South Korea (ROK) stretches back a long 15 years to the signing of the Korean Armistice at Panmunjom in July 1953. The Armistice ended the overt war waged on the battlefield, but it failed to halt less direct North Korean efforts to subvert the South. And in the past two years these efforts have become so blatant that little question remains that North Korea's intentions are precisely what they were in 1950: to conquer South Korea and bring her under Communist domination -- all in the guise of reunification.

For a while after the Armistice it appeared that Pyongyang hoped South Korea would collapse under its own weight. But Pyongyang was disappointed. The South Korean economy (with considerable western help) got started creakily, began to grow, managed to maintain its equilibrium, and by 1965 was booming. The South Korean political system, again to Pyongyang's disappointment, was not eaten away by corruption and did not alienate the South Korean people, but did manage to establish an effective power base. General Pak Chong-hui, who led a successful coup in 1961, was formally elected President in 1963 (and again in 1967) and the ROK government has provided an effective, stable administration.

A stable government and a growing economy scarcely provide a fertile field for revolutionary political change, a fact which apparently obliged Kim Il-song and his cohorts to revise their strategy in 1966. Following the meeting of the Korean Workers' (Communist) Party in October of that year, Pyongyang announced that North Korea's Seven-Year Plan for economic development would be postponed for three years owing to "increased military requirements." And in less than three weeks a series of incidents broke out along the 38th parallel, the demarcation line which stretches 150 miles across the Korean peninsula. (It is sandwiched between the northern and southern sectors of the mile-wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) which has divided Korea since the closing days of World War II.) The first of these incidents occurred on 2 November 1966, following President Johnson's departure from Seoul after a state visit, when the North Koreans ambushed and killed six American and one South Korean soldier in the southern portion of the DMZ. This incident was to mark an upsurge of violations of the Korean Armistice and give tangible meaning to the North Korean Workers' Party statement about "increased military requirements" -- which hindsight has shown meant intensified military and subversive actions against the ROK government.

The year 1967 witnessed the proliferation of North Korean attacks against the ROK on all fronts. At sea, numerous South Korean fishing vessels were captured and a South Korean patrol boat was blown out of the water

by North Korean ships. On land, the North Koreans killed a total of 131 South Korean and American soldiers and wounded 294, most of whom were part of the United Nations Command forces assigned to patrol the DMZ, as stipulated in the Armistice. During this year there were 445 incidents involving gunfire along the DMZ, plus others within South Korea. During one such incident the North Koreans sabotaged two ROK railroad trains causing numerous civilian casualties.

In December 1967, Kim Il-song reiterated once again the North Korean intention to "unify" all of Korea under Communist domination by means of armed force. This was the third time he had so threatened -- in an earlier pronouncement, in fact, he promised the North Korean people that he would conquer the South "within our generation."

A month later, on 21 January 1968, the North Koreans sent 31 men to Seoul disguised as ROK officers and South Korean civilians. Their assignment was to break into the Presidential residence, Blue House, and assassinate President Pak Chong-hui. Two days later, on 23 January 1968, North Korean naval craft boarded the USS Pueblo and forced the ship into Wonsan Harbor.

In the course of 1968 an estimated 1,000 North Koreans crossed over the DMZ into South Korea or were landed, mostly in three-man squads, by small boat on South Korea's isolated beaches. More than one-third of this number were killed or captured, or killed themselves to avoid capture. By September 1968 North Korean "suicide squads" were conducting ambushes of United Nations Command forces and planting land mines south of the DMZ. Later in the fall North Korean patrol boats captured four South Korean fishing vessels and 37 crew members off the eastern coast of South Korea; seven fishing boats had been seized the previous week.

The North Korean pressures were maintained against South Korea throughout the fall and in early November culminated in the North's greatest single attack since the signing of the Korean Armistice: the clandestine landing of 120 well-armed and trained men on the shore of South Korea. The landing occurred in severe winter weather during the night of 2 November in the sparsely populated east coast region near the town of Ulchin. It was preceded by a diversionary effort by North Korean infiltrators on the morning of 1 November near Sosan on the west coast of South Korea. Later that day a ROK force sweeping the area killed two intruders in a gunfight. A large cache of equipment, including dynamite was discovered nearby.

After the landing near Ulchin, the North Korean invaders moved into a small village in broad daylight, conducted propaganda sessions and distributed large sums of ROK currency (later reported to be counterfeit). Four villagers were killed by the intruders. The same day a series of fights broke out in the DMZ, one of them provoked by a platoon-sized North Korean raid. Like the west coast landing, these engagements are believed to have been diversionary efforts.

The North Korean intruders managed to continue their activities, but at a steadily decreasing rate as ROK security forces conducted rigorous counter operations. Two months after their landing, North Korean losses totaled close to 100 dead, and six captured. In the meantime 27 South Korean civilians had become casualties..

Back in North Korea, Pyongyang radio threatened the "execution" of South Koreans who worked against the Communists; subversive operations sections in the Ministry of National Defense were reorganized and strengthened and a leading guerrilla warfare specialist was appointed Minister of National Defense. The new Minister, General Choe Hyon, an old hand at guerrilla warfare, had most recently been commandant of the Military Liberation College which trains agents for infiltration and guerrilla warfare.

Year end estimates by military experts brought the North Korean paramilitary forces to a greatly expanded 20,000 or more men whose training has featured preparations for winter commando operations. The 124th Army Unit alone was expanded to 5,000 men -- trained and available for operations in the South. The 124th, whose basic mission is clandestine operations and sabotage in South Korea, was responsible for both the attempted assassination of President Pak and the Ulchin landings in November.

In addition to the strengthening of the 124th, North Korean foot reconnaissance units along the DMZ have also been beefed up. These units, responsible for collecting intelligence on military targets immediately south of the DMZ, are believed to be undergoing training for guerrilla warfare. In related events the Chosen Soren (a Pyongyang-controlled Korean residents' organization in Japan) has reportedly established a number of secret agent training centers in Japan and is believed to have sent as many as 150 agents to South Korea during the year.

With the foregoing as both background and preface, the hopes for peace in Korea look dimmer with each successive year, especially since it is a matter of record that Kim Il-song has averred he will conquer South Korea and achieve "reunification" on his terms "within our generation."